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Abstract
In this paper we examine a collective decision problem, where the set of heterogeneous
individuals is partitioned into several groups, each choosing its own policy (e.g., location
of a public project) from the given policy space. The model is that of \horizontal product
dierentiation" where individuals display distinct preferences over the policy space. We
rst consider the notion of \eÆcient" partition that minimizes the total policy-related
costs and aggregate personalized costs. (The latter are incurred when an individual
belongs to a group that does not choose her most preferred, ideal, policy.) We then
examine \sustainable" partitions, in which the policy-related costs can be distributed in
a way that no subgroup (belonging to the partition or not) has an incentive to break away
from the rest and to set its own policy. Our main result is that, with a unidimensional
policy space and single-peaked personalized costs, every eÆcient partition is sustainable.
We further describe some important features of eÆciency by characterizing the eÆcient
distribution (and number) of policies chosen from the policy space when their cost is
small. It turns out that eÆciency is achieved when the distribution of policies follows
the square root of the density of individuals' ideal choices.
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1 Introduction
Consider a group of heterogeneous agents that display dierent preferences over the given
set of feasible policies I. The agents can act as a united group and choose only one policy from
the set I, or alternatively, they may partition themselves into several groups, each making
its own selection from I. Since each policy carries monetary cost, increasing returns to scale
of large groups generate advantages for the \grand coalition" of all agents that reduces a per
capita contribution towards the monetary cost of implementing that policy. On the other
hand, the heterogeneity of preferences within a large group may create a situation where some
agents face a policy far away from their most preferred choice. In this case these agents face
high \personalized costs," that grow with the \distance" between the chosen policy and their
ideal choice. It could be possible, therefore, that a subgroup of dissatised agents would
consider a break-up from the rest of the group, and selection of a dierent policy that better
ts the preferences of its members and reduces their personalized costs. Thus, low costs of the
policy implementation could make a multi-group conguration more eÆcient than the grand
coalition, the formation of which is unlikely in many cases. It is important to stress again that
this phenomena is due to \horizontal product dierentiation" that, in our model, amounts to
heterogeneity of agents' preferences over the policy. In contrast, a multi-group conguration
would not arise in the traditional public good problem without congestion eects, where
public goods are \vertically dierentiated", and all agents exhibit identical preferences based
on either quantity or quality attributes of public goods.
The aforementioned conict between increasing returns to scale and heterogeneity of
agents' preferences arises in many dierent contexts. For example, a large political party,
as compared to a small one, may provide a higher level of material, political or career bene-
ts for its members. However, the political platforms chosen by the large party could create
a dissent among substantial number of party members who would prefer a dierent policy
choice, and may even prompt some of them to leave the party. In an economy where the local
public goods are produced by means of either proportional or poll tax, a large jurisdiction
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may lessen the agents' tax burden. However the choice of public policy or amount of public
goods produced within the jurisdiction could be undesirable for some of its residents. Indeed,
a substantial investment in public schools may be undesirable for childless families or agents.
Another important example of conict between the size of the group and the population het-
erogeneity arises in the context of the country formation when a region of a country may
contemplate a secession if the gap between monetary, ethnic, cultural or religious policies of
the central government and the regional expectations and aspirations becomes too large.
In order to formally examine the outcomes of the decision-making process, whether the
grand coalition or a multi-group conguration, we rst address the issue of their \eÆciency".
Every partition of agents and choice of the corresponding policies generates two cost compo-
nents: the total monetary cost of chosen policies and the aggregate personalized costs. Note
that the rst cost component rises with the number of selected policies, whereas the second
component decreases with the number of policies. When the preferences of the agents are
quasi-linear with respect to some numeraire, i.e., if utility is transferable across agents, a
collective decision is Pareto eÆcient if it minimizes the total cost generated by the decision.
The description of the collective decision problem is still incomplete since it provides no
mechanism of sharing the policy costs among agents choosing the same policy. (Indeed, a
government must know how to tax its citizens to nance implementation of public policies. A
jurisdiction must as well decide on the tax burden of its residents for nancing a new public
project, etc.) In other words, when the eÆcient partition of agents has formed and a set of
policies has been chosen, the allocation of the cost among the agents should be determined.
For an arbitrarily chosen cost allocation, however, there may exist a group C of agents that can
reject the proposed collective arrangement by choosing a policy and a device for nancing it
such that everybody in C would be better o compared to the current arrangement. Our main
purpose is to examine those collective decisions and corresponding cost allocations that are
\sustainable" in the sense that no group can reject a proposed arrangement. The sustainability
requirement serves as the group-participation constraint, which is of particular importance in
absence of a strong central authority capable of enforcing a collective arrangement against the
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wishes of some agents.
The sustainability notion employed here is quite strong. We allow for every group of agents
to pose a threat to proposed arrangement. When the partition of agents and their policies
are determined, the arrangement should be immune against the threats from \inside", i.e., no
group choosing the same policy can suggest an alternative policy choice that will make every
member of the group better o. The immunity should also be from \outside" threats, i.e.,
no group that consists of agents originally choosing dierent policies can make its members
better o by uniting. Both the \inside" and the \outside" threats can be made by groups
that are not in any way related to the original partition. Thus, the sustainability requirement
imposes very stringent constraints on the selection of the nancing device. It is not surprising,
therefore, that one has to impose some restrictions in order to guarantee the existence of
sustainable allocations. We demonstrate that the unidimensionality of set of policies and
single-peakedness of personalized agents' costs over the policy space not only guarantee the
existence of a sustainable partition, but also yields the equivalence of eÆcient and sustainable
partitions. That is, every eÆcient partition is also sustainable!
On the formal level, our model uses the notion of public project (Mas-Colell (1980)). It
appears in many dierent settings and can accommodate virtually any interpretation, as
long as the benet derived by an agent from the project is not aected by the size and the
composition of the group of other agents who are assigned to the same project, i.e., the public
project is pure in the traditional sense. In particular, the problem of choosing public policies
that we discussed earlier can be restated using the new terminology (i.e., I is now the set of
feasible public projects, from which groups of agents have to make choices), without any loss
of generality.
The description of a public project may involve many characteristics including notably
its location. If projects are public facilities (hospitals, swimming-pools, libraries, etc.) and
location is the parameter of horizontal dierentiation, then the personalized costs to which we
referred above are simply the transportation costs to projects' locations
1
. The cost of every
1
The transportation costs leads to private costly access as dened by Cremer and Laont (2000) but they
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project depends on the number of agents assigned to it (users) and is assumed to consist of the
project-independent xed cost and the variable cost that increases with the number of users.
As we indicated above, we impose two major assumptions: as in the traditional Hotelling
model, the parameter of horizontal dierentiation of the policy space is unidimensional, and
the personalized (transportation) costs are single-peaked in the policy space. In all other
aspects our model is very general and we allow for arbitrary populations of agents ranging
from atomic sets to atomless probability distributions to general distributions. As was said,
our main result yields the equivalence of the sets of eÆcient and sustainable partitions.
We also examine the number of projects determined by eÆcient partitions within any given
subset of the policy space. By identifying every agent with her most preferred project, we
establish the simple relationship between the population density on any given subset J of the
policy space and the eÆcient number of projects assigned to J and prove that the asymptotic
density of eÆciently located projects is proportional to the square root of the population
density. The square root stresses the equalizing eect of eÆciently distributed public projects
on the agents: subsets J with a low population density typically get more than their \fair
share" of public projects on the expense of areas with high population density. In particular,
it may happen that a subset with a smaller population will receive a larger number of projects
than a subset with a larger population.
The paper is organized as follows. After the review of related literature, we present the
model and state our main result on equivalence of eÆciency and sustainability. In Section 3
we examine the number of projects supported by eÆcient partitions. In addition, we establish
the link between the population density and the number of projects in an eÆcient partition
within any given subset of the policy space. In Section 4 we prove our main result. Proofs of
other results are relegated to the Appendix.
Related Literature
This paper lies at the crossroads of many dierent elds: combinatorial optimization, co-
assume that the private access cost of a customer does not depend upon the public project to which she is
assigned.
5
operative games with a continuum of players, theoretical public nance and political economy,
and will describe the relationship of our work with these dierent topics.
The analysis of cost minimization in uncapacitated facility location problems, akin to
those arising in the context of horizontally dierentiated public projects, even though the
facility location problems face exogenously given (and nite) number of choices rather than
endogenous set of locations. It has become a major topic of research in operations research
and combinatorial optimization. After noticing that facility location problem can be expressed
as a linear-integer problem (Balinski (1965)), the emphasis has been on the search of eÆcient
algorithms to compute the solution to this problem, or, at least, its approximation. This
literature is surveyed in Cornuejols, Nemhauser and Wolsey (1990) and is still a subject of
very active research.
Although the operations research literature has primarily focused on the algorithmic as-
pects of cost minimization problems, some recent contributions address the issue of eÆcient
cost allocations. Existence of the core have received some attention and is the subject of
several contributions (Goemans and Skutella (2000), Grishukhin (1994), Kolen (1983), Kolen
and Tamir (1990), Tamir (1992), Trubin (1976)). The rst result shows that the core of the
cost allocation game induced by a facility location problem is nonempty if and only if there
is no integrality gap, i.e., if the value of the linear-integer program is the same as the value of
the program where the integer constraints have been relaxed to linear constraints. Using this
result, Goemans and Skutella (2000) show that there is no integrality gap when transporta-
tion costs are single peaked over the unidimensional set of feasible locations, thus yielding the
nonempty core in this case. However, these contributions assume the niteness of the sets of
agents and exogenously given facilities whereas we consider any type of distributions and an
endogenous choice of policies as we believe that many environments are better represented by
this framework.
The literature on cooperative games with a continuum of players has mostly focused on the
Shapley value, originally dened only for games with a nite number of players (Aumann and
Shapley (1974)). There are few papers on the core of cooperative games with a continuum of
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players (Ichiishi and Weber (1978), Kannai (1969), Schmeidler (1967), Weber (1981), Wooders
(1983), Wooders and Zame (1984)). This literature, surveyed in Kannai (1992), has mostly
focused on the appropriate extension of the notion of balancedness for games with a continuum
of players. Here, we do not use balancedness and instead we exploit the specic nature of our
game and perform a limit argument. There is a more recent literature on the core of games
with a continuum of players (Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (1999), Epstein and Marinnaci
(2001)), but the auxiliary games that we consider do not satisfy their conditions, and so the
proofs must take a dierent route.
Finally, our paper relates to the literature on the formation of jurisdictions which is also
based on a trade-o between the heterogeneity of citizens' preferences across and economies of
scale (Casella (1992), Cremer, De Kerchove and Thisse (1885), Greenberg and Weber (1986),
Guesnerie and Oddou (1981)(1987), Jehiel and Scotchmer (2001), Konishi, Le Breton and
Weber (1998), Weber and Zamir (1985), Westho (1977), Wooders (1978)). There is also a
more recent literature on the political economy of the process of country formation (Alesina
and Spolaore (1997), Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000), Bolton, Spolaore and Roland
(1996), Wei (1991)) where the threat of secession and its impact of the equilibrium cong-
uration is explicitly considered. In many of these papers the world population is described
through a continuous distribution but except for Haimanko, Le Breton and Weber (2001) and
Le Breton and Weber (1999), the role of transfers to deter secession threats is not very much
investigated. Haimanko, Le Breton and Weber (2001) demonstrate the necessity of transfers
for polarized distributions while Le Breton and Weber (2000) oer a partial characterization
of the transfer mechanisms.
2 The Model
We consider a society that consists of agents with preferences over the set I of feasible
locations of public projects. The set I is assumed to be unidimensional and is given by the
interval [0; 1]. Every agent t has an ideal point in I and the preferences that are symmetric
7
and single-picked, and we identify t with her ideal point in I. The distribution of ideal points
is given by a cumulative distribution function F; dened over the space I: It is important to
stress that we do not impose any restrictions on the distribution function and even allow for
\atoms", i.e., for positive masses of agents to be located at the same point of I: The only
property of F we need is its monotonicity on the interval [0; 1] : We denote by  the measure
on I induced by the distribution function F with the total mass (I) equal to 1.
A subset of I which is a union of a nite number of intervals will be called a community.
For notational and analytical simplicity, we will restrict our attentions to communities when
subsets of I will be involved.
The costs associated with any project p must be covered by the community C  I of its
users. The cost of the project, given by
G(p; C) = g(p) + (C); (1)
consists of two components: the positive xed cost of setting and maintaining the project,
g(p), and the variable cost that depends on the number of project users,  (C), where  ia
nonnegative constant. We assume
2
that the xed cost of all projects is the same:
Fixed Cost Invariance: g(p) = g for all projects p 2 I.
This assumption implies that for a given group of users C, the project cost G(p; C) is
independent of a choice of the project p. Thus, we can simply use the notation G(C) instead
of G(p; C).
If an agent t resides in community C that uses project p 2 I, the disutility or \transporta-
tion" cost incurred by t, d(t; p), is determined by the distance between t and the location p of
the project. We only require that
Continuity and Monotonicity of Transportation Costs: The cost function d(t; p) = d(jt 
pj) is continuous and (strictly) increasing in the distance jt  pj, with d(0) = 0:
2
Our main result remains intact even if this assumption is weakened, by assuming that g(p) is a continuous
and positive-valued function of p. Fixed cost invariance assumption will nevertheless be maintained, for the
sake of convenience and increased clarity of proofs.
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If only one project serves the entire population, it could be far away from signicant
fraction of agents whose ideal points are located close to one of the margins. Thus, in order
to examine eÆciency and sustainability of the set of chosen projects, it is natural to consider
a multi-project setting. Let P be a (nonempty) nite ordered set (p
1
; : : : ; p
K
) of projects,
and  is an ordered partition of I into communities (C
1
; C
2
; : : : ; C
K
), where the community
C
k
represents the set of users of the project p
k
. Every two dierent communities C
k
; C
l
2 ,
have an empty intersection, and the union of all communities in  covers the entire set I, i.e.,
each agent t 2 I belongs to one and only one community in . For notational and analytic
simplicity, we restrict our examination only to communities that consist of a nite number of
intervals.
Every pair (P; ), where the set of projects P and the partition  have the same number
of elements, will be referred to as project-user conguration (or PUC). An important class of
PUC consists of pairs (P; ), where each community C 2  is a convex set, or, simply, an
interval. In this case communities of users satisfy the connectedness property: for every three
users, t < t
0
< t
00
, whenever t and t
00
belong to the same community C, the user t
0
must belong
to C as well. Such partitions  will be called \connected".
For every PUC (P; ), we shall denote by T (P; ) the aggregate (transportation and
project) cost incurred by PUC (P; ):
T (P; ) =
K
X
k=1
[D(p
k
; C
k
) +G(C
k
)] ;
where for every k, the aggregate transportation cost of community C
k
served by project p
k
,
D(p
k
; C
k
), is given by
D(p
k
; C
k
) =
Z
C
k
d(jt  p
k
j)d(t):
For every community C we denote by D(C) the minimal transportation cost within C:
D(C) = inf
p2I
Z
C
d (jt  pj) d(t):
We shall show that the set of projects p, at which this inmum is attained, is nonempty. Every
such project p will be called C-optimal.
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We are now in a position to introduce the notion of eÆcient PUC:
Denition: A PUC (P; ) is called eÆcient if it minimizes the aggregate cost over all PUC,
i.e., T (P; )  T (P
0
; 
0
) for any (P
0
; 
0
). If (P; ) is an eÆcient PUC, P will be called
an eÆcient set of projects, and  will be called an eÆcient partition.
This denition immediately implies that in every eÆcient partition, every community
chooses its optimal project:
Remark 2.1: Let PUC (P; ), where P = (p
1
; : : : ; p
K
) is the set of projects, and  =
(C
1
; C
2
; : : : ; C
K
) is the set of corresponding communities, be eÆcient. Then for every
k = 1; : : : ;K, the project p
k
is C
k
-optimal.
Our rst result states that an eÆcient PUC always exists. Moreover, there exists an
eÆcient PUC (P; ) such that every C 2  is an interval:
Proposition 2.2: There exist an eÆcient PUC. Moreover, there is an eÆcient PUC (P; )
such that the partition  is connected.
The following proposition shows that in many cases the eÆcient set of projects uniquely (up
to inclusion or exclusion of boundary points) determines the corresponding eÆcient partition,
and thus the entire PUC. For this reason, the attention can be sometimes conned only to
eÆcient sets of projects (as will be done, for instance, in the next section).
Proposition 2.3: Let (P; ) be a an eÆcient PUC such that P = (p
1
; : : : ; p
K
) (K  2)
with p
1
< p
2
< : : : < p
K
. If the distribution of ideal points possesses a continuous and
strictly positive density function, then the eÆcient partition  = (I
1
; : : : ; I
K
) is uniquely
determined (up to the boundary points of the communities in ) by
I
1
= [0;
p
1
+ p
2
2
); : : : ; I
k
= [
p
k 1
+ p
k
2
;
p
k
+ p
k+1
2
); : : : ; I
K
= [
p
K 1
+ p
K
2
; 1]:
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This proposition demonstrates that the eÆcient partition is, in fact, the set of intervals
[0; b
1
); : : : ; [b
k
; b
k+1
); : : : ; [b
K 1
; 1], where every \cut-o" user b
k
, k = 1; : : : ;K   1; is equally
close to project p
k 1
on her left and project p
k
on her right.
By Remark 2.1, every community that constitutes a part of an eÆcient partition always
selects its optimal project. This means that there is no other project that would reduce the
total costs of this community. However, it does not rule out a possibility that the eÆcient
conguration would not be stable under a threat of rejection by a group of users that consists
of parts of dierent communities in . To address this issue, we must examine how the
project costs are allocated within a community of users. The charges that should be imposed
on project users in order to cover the project cost cannot be found in, or deduced from, the
description of a PUC, and any community C 2  has to determine the monetary contribution
of each resident t towards the project cost G(C). To formalize the discussion, we introduce
the notion of a C-cost allocation, which allows for all lump sum transfers within C that satisfy
the budget constraint:
Denition: A measurable function x dened on the set C is called a C-cost allocation if
Z
C
x (t) d (t) = G (C) : (2)
If (P; ) is a PUC, where  = (C
1
; : : : ; C
K
), and x
k
is a C
k
-cost allocation for k =
1; : : : ;K, the vector x = (x
1
; : : : ; x
K
) will be called a (P; )-cost allocation.
It is natural, and important, to ask whether a given eÆcient allocation (P; ) is sustainable
in the face of possible rejections by groups of users. That is, whether there exists a (P; )-cost
allocation x such that no set of users C can defy the arrangement dictated by x, select its own
project, and come up with a cost sharing scheme that reduces the total cost incurred by every
member of C. The existence of non-sustainable eÆcient PUC would signicantly undermine
the eÆciency appeal, and, if all eÆcient PUC turn out to be non-sustainable, it would provide
a cause for further concern about robustness of our eÆciency concept. Fortunately, and
surprisingly, sustainability and eÆciency turn out to be equivalent concepts. The following
denition, which formalizes the notion of sustainability, is followed by our main result.
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Denition: Consider a PUC (P; ) with P = (p
1
; : : : ; p
K
);  = (C
1
; : : : ; C
K
); and a (P; )-
cost allocationx = (x
1
(t); : : : ; x
K
(t)). We say that community C can reject the PUC
(P; ), given x, if there is a C-cost allocation x and p 2 I such that for every k =
1; : : : ;K, the total costs incurred by agent t 2 C \ C
k
will be smaller at C than that
assigned by (P; ), i.e.,
x
k
(t) + d(jt  p
k
j) > x(t) + d(jt  pj):
That is, no community can make all its members better o by rejecting the collective
proposal (represented by (P; ) and x) and acting independently. If no community can
reject (P; ) ; this PUC is called sustainable.
The main result of this paper is
Main Result: A PUC is eÆcient if and only if it is sustainable.
The result establishes sustainability of eÆcient PUC under the unanimity requirement for
the members of the breakaway community. This requirement is natural, under the assumption
that all agents who break away do so voluntarily. Also note that since the rejection rule that
we adopted is rather strong (a rejection by C requires no full or even partial approval of its
complement in I), the theorem also implies sustainability of eÆcient PUC under less stringent
rules of rejection.
EÆciency of a sustainable PUC (P; ) is the easy direction of Main Result. Indeed,
no community C can choose a project and a cost allocation in such a way that the total
costs incurred by community C would be lower than those allocated to C by the sustainable
allocation. Otherwise, C would reject the proposed allocation. Thus, no selection of projects
and a subsequent partition of I into users communities can lower the total costs incurred by
I, which implies the eÆciency of (P; ).
The proof of the opposite direction of the theorem that ensures the sustainability of every
eÆcient partition is much more involved. First, for every population measure  we associate
our problem with the cooperative game V

, that assigns the value V

(C) for every community
C. We then consider the core of this game, which is the set of measures  on I, such that for
all communities C  (C)  V

(C) with equality for the set I, i.e.,  (I)  V

(I).
By using the link between our game and a facility location problem (Goemans and Skutella
(2000)) with a nite set of agents and exogenously given locations, we rst demonstrate that
in the case when the set of agents is a nite \atomic" set, i.e., the measure  has a nite
support, the core of the game V

is nonempty. We further develop quite extensive machinery
in order to apply the approximation arguments and to extend the nonemptiness of the core
V

to the class of general measures . Finally, we pick a measure  from the (nonempty)
core of the game V

and slightly perturb  in order to obtain a measure  that satises two
desirable properties: it belongs to the core of V

and is absolutely continuous with respect
to . Then, by applying the Radon-Nykodim Theorem, we explicitly assign a cost share to
every agent in such away that guarantee sustainability of the given eÆcient PUC.
Proposition 2.2 and Main Result imply the existence of a connected sustainable partition.
We would like to point out that our problem does not belong to the class of \consecutive
games" (Greenberg andWeber (1986), Demange (1994)), where nancing devices are restricted
in such a way that only consecutive (or connected) coalitions may pose a threat of rejection.
In our framework it would simply imply that if an arrangement is rejected by some community
C, there is an interval J that would also reject this arrangement. Since here we do not a priori
restrict the set of possible nancing devices, we cannot ignore a possible threat of rejection by
disconnected groups of agents. Thus, we cannot use the general combinatorial arguments used
to prove the nonemptiness of the core in consecutive games (Greenberg and Weber (1986) and
Le Breton, Owen and Weber (1992)).
3 Quantitative Aspects of EÆciency
The results of the previous section state that an eÆcient PUC always exists, and that
every eÆcient PUC can be supported by a suitable cost allocation scheme. It is natural to
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take the next step and to inquire more precisely into the structure of eÆcient PUC. In this
section we examine the number of projects that can be supported by an eÆcient PUC and
the distribution of projects over the interval I. More specically, we derive the relationship
between the mass and density of agents on a subset C of I with the number of projects
assigned to C by an eÆcient conguration.
In order to deal with these issues, we assume throughout this section that
Assumption A: The distribution F possesses a strictly positive and continuous density func-
tion f .
Furthermore, we adopt an asymptotic framework and consider a society where the number
of projects in the eÆcient set is large. All the parameters of the model, except the xed cost
component g, will be kept unchanged, so we can focus on the impact of the xed costs by
examining the situation where the value of g tends to zero. Resorting to asymptotic analysis
helps to avoid the need to explicitly describe the eÆcient PUC, which is an unreasonably
diÆcult task for a general distribution function.
3
The results obtained in this framework are quite sharp. For every interval J  I we will be
able to assess the number of projects from the eÆcient set located in J , and the precision of
our assessment will rise with the enlargement of the eÆcient set which is achieved by reduction
of the project costs. Furthermore, the formula that we develop exhibits a tight and simple
link between the limiting distribution of projects in the eÆcient set and the distribution of
population, thus allowing simple comparisons of the numbers of projects eÆciently allocated
to dierent intervals.
Formally, consider a subinterval J of I. For every positive level of xed costs g, choose
an eÆcient PUC (P
g
; 
g
) and denote by K
J
(g) the number of projects in P
g
located in J .
The rst result of this section describes the asymptotic behavior of K
J
(g) as g falls to zero,
revealing the limiting distribution of the projects from the eÆcient set over I (and does not
depend on a particular chosen family of eÆcient PUC f(P
g
; 
g
)g
g>0
) :
3
In a special case where the distribution of agents' preferences is uniform, an eÆcient PUC has been
examined in Alesina and Spolaore (1997).
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Proposition 3.1: Suppose that the distance function d has the right hand derivative at zero,
d
0
(0). Then for every interval J  I;
lim
g!0
K
g
(J)
p
g =
q
d
0
(0)
2
Z
J
q
f (t)dt: (3)
Note that that within the class of distributions we consider, the uniform distribution would
generate the maximal number of projects to be chosen by an eÆcient PUC.
It is also worth to pointing out that since the asymptotic \density" of eÆciently located
projects is proportional to the square root of the population density, areas with low population
density typically get more than their \fair share" of public projects on the expense of areas
with high population density. In particular, it may happen that an interval with a smaller
population will have a larger number of projects than an interval with a larger population.
Indeed
R
J
1
f (t) dt <
R
J
2
f (t) dt (i.e.,  (J
1
) <  (J
2
)) could be perfectly consistent with the
reverse inequality
R
J
1
q
f (t)dt >
R
J
2
q
f (t)dt:
One important side of eÆciency is that, in the limit, it has a strong equalizing eect on
everyones' transportation costs. More precisely, regardless of the population density, in the
limit the average transportation cost incurred by agents connected to the same project is
approximately the same for any eÆciently located project:
Proposition 3.2: Suppose again that the function d has a right hand derivative at zero.
Let J  I be an arbitrary interval and denote by D
g
(J) the total transportation cost
incurred by an eÆcient PUC (P
g
; 
g
) on agents in J . Put t
g
(J) 
D
g
(J)
K
g
(J)
(the average
aggregate transportation cost per project in J): Then lim
g!0
t
g
(J)
g
= 1.
To illustrate the results presented in this section, consider the following example where
the density function of agents' ideal points is given by
4
:
f(t) =
(
1
2
if t 2 L  [0;
1
2
);
3
2
if t 2 R  [
1
2
; 1]:
4
This density function is discontinuous at the point
1
2
. However, the example can be easily modied to
satisfy Assumption A.
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Assume also that the distance function d is linear.
It is easy to see that if J is a subinterval of either L or R; then a J-optimal project is
simply the midpoint of J: Propositions 3.1 and 2.3 (or Lemma B.1 from the Appendix) now
imply that if the value of xed cost g is suÆciently low, then the eÆcient set consists of l(g)
equidistant projects on the interval L and r(g) equidistant projects on the interval R, and
that
r(g)
l(g)

p
3. Furthermore, by Proposition 3.2, in the limit the agents in both intervals, L
and R; incur the same average transportation cost.
It is important to note that no such equalization would have been possible were the projects
locations to match the population density and not its square root. If the projects were indeed
allocated on the basis of density, the interval R would receive three times more projects then
the interval L. Since the aggregate cost of transportation to a project incurred by its users
community is proportional to the square of the size of the community, it is easy to verify
that the average transportation costs to a project in L would be three times higher than to a
project in R.
4 Proof of Main Result
First, we need some notation and denitions. Let X be a Borel subset of R with the
topology induced from R. Denote by M (X) the set of (positive) Borel measures and by
M (X) the subset of probability measures on X. We start with the denitions of a game and
its core utilized in this section.
Denition: A game is a real valued set function dened for all (nonempty) communities in
I: Given a game u; the core of u is dened as the set of all measures  2 M (I) such
that  (C)  v (C) for all communities C; and  (I) = v (I) :
Let a positive constant g and a strictly increasing function d : [0; 1] ! <
+
be given. For
every community C and measure  2M (I) denote:
v (; C) = g +D(C);
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where, as in Section 2,
D(C) = inf
p2I
Z
C
d (jt  pj) d(t): (4)
The nonempty set of \optimal" p, i.e. those at which the minimum in (5) is attained, will be
denoted by OP (; C).
For all  2M (I) dene the game V

as follows:
V

(C) =
(
v (; C) ; if C 6= I;
inf
P
v (; C
j
) ; if C = I;
(5)
where the inmum is taken over all partitions (C
1
; : : : ; C
K
) of I into communities.
We are now in position to state Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, the proofs of which are presented
in the Appendix. Assuming the validity of these propositions, we then prove our Main Result.
Proposition 4.1: For any  2M (I), the game V

has a nonempty core.
The following result provides us with an absolutely continuous measure in the core. To
recall, a measure  is absolutely continuos with respect to measure , or -absolutely contin-
uous, if (C) = 0 whenever (C) = 0.
Proposition 4.2: For any  2 M (I), the core of the game V

contains a measure which is
absolutely continuous with respect to .
The Radon-Nikodym Theorem (Halmos (1988), Theorem B) implies that for any measure
, which is - absolutely continuous, there is a -integrable function , called the Radon-
Nikodym derivative of , such that for every C
 (C) =
Z
C
 (t) d (t) :
We shall call  a core allocation of the game V

if the corresponding measure  belongs to the
core of V

. In other words,  is a core allocation of V

if and only if it is a Radon-Nikodym
\derivative" with respect to  of some measure in the core of V

. Proposition 4.2 yields:
Corollary 4.3: For any  2M (I) the set of core allocations of V

is nonempty.
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Proof of Main Result: We will show rst that any eÆcient PUC is sustainable. Let
(P; ) be an eÆcient PUC with P = (p
1
; : : : ; p
K
) and  = (C
1
; : : : ; C
K
) : EÆciency immedi-
ately implies the inequality
K
0
X
k=1
v (; C
0
k
) 
K
X
k=1
v (; C
k
) ;
for any partition 
0
= (C
0
1
; C
0
2
; : : : ; C
0
K
0
) of I. By (??), this yields
V

(I) =
K
X
k=1
v (; C
k
) :
Let  be a core allocation of the game V

, the existence of which is guaranteed by Corollary
4.3. For every k = 1; : : : ;K and t 2 C
k
dene
x
k
(t) =  (t)  d



t  p
k




+ :
We show rst that, for each k = 1; : : : ;K; x
k
is a C
k
-cost allocation. It suÆces to demonstrate
that
Z
C
k
 (t)  (t) = g +
Z
C
k
d



t  p
k




d (t) ( = v (; C
k
) ) (6)
since this clearly implies the budget constraint (??) on x
k
. To this end, consider the measure
given by  (T ) =
R
T
(t)d (t) : Since  is a core allocation, the measure  is in the core of V

.
Therefore  (C
k
)  v (; C
k
) for any k, and since
K
X
k=1
 (C
j
) =  (I) = V

(I) =
K
X
k=1
v (; C
k
) ;
it follows that  (C
k
) = v (; C
k
) for all k. Thus (??) is satised, and so x
k
is an C
k
-cost
allocation.
We claim next that no community C can reject (P; ) given

x
1
(t); : : : ; x
K
(t)

: Indeed,
suppose, in negation, that there is a community C and a C-cost allocation x such that for
every k = 1; : : : ;K and t 2 C \ C
k
x
k
(t) + d(jt  p
k
j) > x(t) + d(jt  pj): (7)
By (??),
Z
C
x (t) d (t) = G (C)  g > 0;
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and so (C) > 0: Thus, by taking an integral with respect to  of both sides of (??), we get
K
X
k=1
Z
C\C
k
h
x
k
(t) + d(jt  p
k
j)
i
d (t) >
K
X
k=1
Z
C\C
k
[x(t) + d(jt  pj)] d (t) : (8)
The left-hand side of (??) is equal to
K
X
k=1
Z
C\C
k
((t) + ) d (t) =
Z
C
(t)d (t) + (S);
and the right hand side of (??) is equal to
K
X
k=1
Z
C\C
k
x(t)d (t) +
K
X
k=1
Z
C\C
k
d(jt  pj)d (t) =
(by using (??))
= G(C) +
Z
C
d(jt  pj)d (t)  (C) + V

(C) :
Thus (??) implies that
(C) =
Z
C
(t)d (t) > V

(C) ;
contradicting the assumption that the measure  is in the core of V

). This establishes the
sustainability of (P; ).
It remains to show that every sustainable PUC (P; ) = ((p
1
; : : : ; p
K
) ; (C
1
; : : : ; C
K
)) is
eÆcient. Let x
1
; x
2
; : : : ; x
K
be C
k
-cost allocations such that no community can reject (P; )
given

x
1
(t); : : : ; x
K
(t)

: To establish eÆciency of (P; ) ; consider a PUC (P
0
; 
0
) with P
0
=
(p
0
1
; : : : ; p
0
K
0
) and 
0
= (C
0
1
; : : : ; C
0
K
0
). Note that for every k
0
D(C
0
k
0
; p
0
k
0
) +G

C
0
k
0


K
X
k=1
Z
C
0
k
0
\C
k
h
x
k
(t) + d(jt  p
k
j)
i
d (t) : (9)
Indeed, if this were not the case, there would be a positive Æ such that a measurable function
y; given on C
0
k
0
by
y (t) = x
k
(t) + d(jt  p
k
j)  d(jt  p
0
k
0
j)  Æ
for each k and t 2 C
0
k
0
\ C
k
; is a C
0
k
0
-cost allocation. Thus
y (t) + d(jt  p
0
k
0
j) < x
k
(t) + d(jt  p
k
j)
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for each k and t 2 C
0
k
0
\ C
k
; which means that the community C
0
k
0
can reject (P; ) (via the
C
0
k
0
-cost allocation y), contrary to the assumption of sustainability of (P; ) :
Inequality (9) and the budget constraint (??) imply that
T (P
0
; 
0
) =
K
0
X
k
0
=1
(D(C
0
k
0
; p
0
k
0
) +G

C
0
k
0

) 
K
0
X
k
0
=1
K
X
k=1
Z
C
0
k
0
\C
k
h
x
k
(t) + d(jt  p
k
j)
i
d (t)
=
K
X
k=1
Z
C
k
h
x
k
(t) + d(jt  p
k
j)
i
d (t) =
K
X
k=1
(D(C
k
; p
k
) +G (C
k
)) = T (P; ):
This establishes the eÆciency of (P; ). 2
5 Appendix
Our Appendix consists of two parts. In Part A we prove the auxiliary results, stated in
Sections 2 and 4, that have been used in the proof of Main Result. In Part B we prove the
propositions stated in Section 3.
5.1 Part A
We endow the setM (X) of positive Borel measures with the weak topology of measures,
in which a sequence f
n
g
1
n=1
 M (X) converges to 
0
2 M (X) if and only if for every
continuous function f on X
lim
n!1
Z
X
f (t) d
n
(t) =
Z
X
f (t) d
0
(t) :
For every subset A of I we denote its topological boundary (relative in I) by @A and for
any measure  2 M (I), the \truncated" measure 
A
is determined for every T  I by

A
(T ) =  (A \ T ). Finally, in what follows let  2 M (I) be the probability measure
corresponding to the distribution function F .
To prove the results, we need several lemmas:
Lemma A.1: The following three conditions on f
n
g
1
n=0
M (I) are equivalent:
(i) f
n
g
1
n=1
converges weakly to 
0
;
(ii) lim
n!1

n
([0; t]) = 
0
([0; t]) for every t such that either 
0
(ftg) = 0 or t = 1;
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(iii) lim
n!1

n
(C) = 
0
(C) for every C  I with 
0
(@C) = 0
Proof: Consider the set X = I [ f2g. Given a sequence f
n
g
1
n=0
satisfying either of the
above conditions, let a = sup
n

n
(I) : We can assume that a > 0; since otherwise the claim is
trivial. For every n dene Q
n
2M(X) by
Q
n
(C) =
(
1
a
[
n
(C \ I) + a  
n
(I)] ; if 2 2 C;
1
a

n
(C) otherwise.
Probability measures fQ
n
g
1
n=0
can be extended to the entire real line R in an obvious fashion.
Let:
(i') fQ
n
g
1
n=1
converges weakly to Q
0
;
(ii') lim
n!1
Q
n
(( 1; t]) = Q
0
(( 1; t]) for every t with Q
0
(ftg) = 0;
(iii') lim
n!1
Q
n
(C) = Q
0
(C) for every C  R with Q
0

e
@C

= 0,
where
e
@C denotes the boundary of C in R.
Note that the pairs of conditions, (i) and (i'), (ii) and (ii'), (iii) and (iii') are equivalent.
Since the equivalence of conditions (i'), (ii'), and (iii') follows from Theorem 28.5 of Billingsley
(1995), it follows that (i), (ii) and (iii) are equivalent as well.2
Note that the equivalence of (i) and (iii) in Lemma A.1, yields the following useful remark:
Remark A.2: Given a nite or countable A  I; and f
n
g
1
n=0
M (I) ; 
A
n
converges weakly
to 
A
0
if and only if lim
n!1

A
n
(ftg) = 
A
0
(ftg) for every t 2 A:
We also utilize:
Lemma A.3: Any sequence f
n
g
1
n=1
M (I) with sup
n

n
(I) <1 has a weakly converging
subsequence.
Proof: By Theorem 29.3 of Billingsley (1995), any sequence of measures in M (I) has a
weakly convergent subsequence. The proof follows by using the method applied in the proof
of Lemma A.1.2
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We now introduce convergence of sets and, in particular, convergence of sequences of inter-
vals. We shall say that a sequence of intervals fI
n
g
1
n=1
converges to interval I
0
if fI
n
nI
0
g
1
n=1
and fI
0
nI
n
g
1
n=1
are monotone sequences of sets (i.e., I
n+1
nI
0
 I
n
nI
0
and I
0
nI
n+1
 I
0
nI
n
for
every n), and
T
1
n=1
I
n
nI
0
=
T
1
n=1
I
0
nI
n
= ;: To exemplify this mode of convergence, denote
by a
n
and b
n
the left and right endpoints of I
n
, and suppose that the sequences fa
n
g
1
n=1
and
fb
n
g
1
n=1
are monotone with lim
n!1
a
n
= a
0
and lim
n!1
b
n
= b
0
: In the case where none of
these sequences becomes constant starting from some n, fI
n
g
1
n=1
converges to I
0
if
I
0
= [a; b] and fa
n
g
1
n=1
is increasing, fb
n
g
1
n=1
is decreasing; or
I
0
= (a; b) and fa
n
g
1
n=1
is decreasing, fb
n
g
1
n=1
is increasing; or
I
0
= [a; b) and both fa
n
g
1
n=1
and fb
n
g
1
n=1
are increasing; or
I
0
= (a; b] and both fa
n
g
1
n=1
and fb
n
g
1
n=1
are decreasing.
In the case where (say) fa
n
g
1
n=1
becomes constant starting from some n and fb
n
g
1
n=1
is de-
creasing, fI
n
g
1
n=1
can converge to either (a; b] or [a; b]: The convergence is to (a; b] if fI
n
g
1
n=1
exclude a (i.e., intervals I
n
are open from the left) starting from some n; and to [a; b] if fI
n
g
1
n=1
include a starting from some n.
We also say that a sequence of communities fC
n
g
1
n=1
converges to a community C
0
if each
C
n
is a union of the same number of disjoint intervals I
n
1
; : : : ; I
n
K
, and, possibly after reordering
the intervals, each fI
n
j
g
1
n=1
converges to I
0
j
:
Lemma A.4: Suppose that a sequence fC
n
g
1
n=1
of communities converges to C
0
; and a se-
quence f
n
g
1
n=1
 M (I) converges weakly to  2 M (I) in a way that f
A
n
g
1
n=1
also
converges weakly to 
A
; where A denotes the set of atoms of  (that is, A = ft 2 I j
 (ftg) > 0g). Then f
C
n
n
g
1
n=1
converges weakly to 
C
0
:
Proof: It can be assumed without loss of generality that every C
n
; n = 0; 1; : : : ; is an
interval. Indeed, since 
C
n
n
=
P
j

I
n
j
n
for intervals I
n
j
whose union is C
n
; it suÆces to show
convergence of all summands. Furthermore, it suÆces to check, by equivalence of (i) and (ii)
in Lemma A.1, that for every interval T = [0; t]
lim
n!1

n
(T \ C
n
) =  (T \ C
0
) : (10)
22
It follows from our assumptions on f
n
g
1
n=1
that 
InA
n
= 
n
  
A
n
converges weakly to

InA
=   
A
: By non-atomicity of 
InA
and (iii) in Lemma A.1
lim
n!1

InA
n
(T \ C
0
) = 
InA
(T \ C
0
) : (11)
Also, for any n
0
0  lim sup
n!1

InA
n
([(C
n
nC
0
) [ (C
0
nC
n
)] \ T )  (12)
 lim sup
n!1

InA
n
((C
n
nC
0
) [ (C
0
nC
n
))  lim sup
n!1

InA
n
((C
n
0
nC
0
) [ (C
0
nC
n
0
)) =
= 
InA
((C
n
0
nC
0
) [ (C
0
nC
n
0
)) ; (13)
where the last equality again follows from (iii) in Lemma A.1. Since the measure 
InA
is
countably additive,
lim
n
0
!1

InA
((C
n
0
nC
0
) [ (C
0
nC
n
0
)) = 0;
and so from (??) - (??)
lim
n!1

InA
n
([(C
n
nC
0
) [ (C
0
nC
n
)] \ T ) = 0:
This fact and (??) yield
lim
n!1

InA
n
(T \ C
n
) = 
InA
(T \ C
0
) : (14)
From Remark A.2 it follows easily that
lim
n!1

A
n
(T \ C
n
) = 
A
(T \ C
0
) :
This, coupled with (??), yields (??). 2
Lemma A.5: Suppose that a sequence fC
n
g
1
n=1
of communities converges to C; and a se-
quence f
n
g
1
n=1
 M (I) converges weakly to  2 M (I) in a way that f
A
n
g
1
n=1
also
converges weakly to 
A
; where A denotes the set of atoms of  (that is, A = ft 2 I j
 (ftg) > 0g). Then
lim
n!1
v (
n
; C
n
) = v (; C) : (15)
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Proof: For every n pick some p (
n
; C
n
) 2 OP (
n
; C
n
) ; and p (; C) 2 OP (; C) : We
show rst that
lim sup
n!1
v (
n
; C
n
)  v (; C) : (16)
Indeed, by denition of p (
n
; C
n
) ;
Z
C
n
d (jt  p (
n
; C
n
)j) d
n
(t) 
Z
C
n
d (jt  p (; C)j) d
n
(t):
However, from Lemma A.4,
lim
n!1
Z
C
n
d (jt  p (; C)j) d
n
(t) =
Z
C
d (jt  p (; C)j) d(t);
and so (??) holds. We show next that
lim inf
n!1
v (
n
; C
n
)  v (; C) : (17)
Otherwise, we could nd fn
k
g
1
k=1
; a subsequence of integers such that
lim inf
k!1
v (
n
k
; C
n
k
) < v (; C) ;
and yet lim
k!1
p (
n
k
; C
n
k
) = p: From Lemma A.4,
lim
k!1
Z
C
n
k
d (jt  pj) d
n
k
(t) =
Z
C
d (jt  pj) d(t): (18)
Since lim
k!1
p (
n
k
; C
n
k
) = p; the functions d (jt  p (
n
k
; C
n
k
)j) converge in the supremum
norm to the function d (jt  pj) ; and so form (??)
lim
k!1
Z
C
n
k
d (jt  p (
n
k
; C
n
k
)j) d
n
k
(t) =
Z
C
d (jt  pj) d(t): (19)
By denition of p (; C) ;
Z
C
d (jt  pj) d(t) 
Z
C
d (jt  p (; C)j) d(t);
and so, from (??),
lim
k!1
v (
n
k
; C
n
k
)  v (; C) ;
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a contradiction, showing that (??) holds. Thus,
lim sup
n!1
v (
n
; C
n
)  v (; C)  lim inf
n!1
v (
n
; C
n
) ;
which implies (??).2
Lemma A.6: There exists a connected partition (I
1
; : : : ; I
K
) of the set I such that
V

(I) = inf
K
X
j=1
v (; I
j
) :
That is, the inmum in (5) is actually attained for some connected partition of I.
Proof: Denote
V

con
(I) = inf
X
v (; I
j
) ;
where the inmum is taken over all nite partitions (I
1
; : : : ; I
K
) of I into disjoint intervals.
We shall demonstrate rst that this inmum is attained for some connected partition of I.
Indeed, there is a sequence
n
(I
n
1
; : : : ; I
n
K(n)
)
o
1
n=1
of partitions of I into disjoint intervals such
that
lim
n!1
K(n)
X
j=1
v

; I
n
j

= V

con
(I) :
Note that K (n) is actually bounded across all n; since g > 0: From compactness of I and the
fact that any sequence of numbers has a monotone subsequence it follows that a subsequence
fn
k
g
1
k=1
of integers can be found such that K (n
k
)  K and finf I
n
k
j
g
1
k=1
and fsup I
n
k
j
g
1
k=1
are
converging monotone sequences. Thus, each I
n
k
j
converges to I
j
, which is either an interval or
the empty set; note that the nonempty intervals I
j
form a partition of I: From Lemma A.5 it
follows that lim
k!1
v

; I
n
k
j

= v (; I
j
) provided I
j
is nonempty, which implies that
V

con
(I)  lim inf
k!1
K
X
j=1
v

; I
n
k
j


X
I
j
6=;
v (; I
j
)  V

con
(I) ;
and so
X
I
j
6=;
v (; I
j
) = V

con
(I) :
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It remains to show that V

(I) = V

con
(I). Take a nite set of projects p
1
; : : : ; p
K
2 I and
consider a partition  of I into disjoint communities C
1
; : : : ; C
K
: Denote by I
1
; : : : ; I
n
all the
intervals whose unions constitute the communities in . Let  
0
be the set of I
j
with  (I
j
) = 0:
Now we perform the following procedure. First, if for some k and l p
k
= p
l
; unite C
k
and C
l
:
Second, if I
j
 C
k
but
Z
I
j
d (jt  p
k
j) >
Z
I
j
d (jt  p
l
j) ;
remove the interval I
j
from C
k
and attach it to C
l
; and continue the process as long as it is
possible. Since the number of intervals is nite, the process will be terminated after a nite
number of changes. Denote by T
1
; : : : ; T
K
the resulting communities, after removal of  
0
;
some of them might be empty. Note that the convex hull of each T
j
is disjoint from any other
community T
l
: Intervals from  
0
can now be added to all T
j
in the way that will make them
convex, but still mutually disjoint. Thus, there are disjoint intervals T
0
1
; : : : ; T
0
K
(some of them
may be empty) that partition I in such a way that
K
X
j=1
Z
T
0
j
d (jt  p
j
j) d (t) 
K
X
j=1
Z
C
j
d (jt  p
j
j) d (t) :
Now, given a partition (C
1
; : : : ; C
K
) of I and p
k
2 OP (; C
k
) for every k = 1; : : : ;K; the
above argument shows that there is a connected partition (I
1
; : : : ; I
K
0
) of I such that
K
0
X
j=1
v (; I
j
) 
K
0
X
j=1
"
Z
I
j
d (jt  p
j
j) d (t) + g
#

K
X
j=1
"
Z
C
j
d (jt  p
j
j) d (t) + g
#
=
K
X
j=1
v (; C
j
) ;
and so
V

con
(I)  inf
X
v (; C
j
) :
Since the opposite inequality is obvious, the proposition is established.2
Lemma A.7: If the measures f
n
g
1
n=1
and  are as in Lemma A.5, then
lim
n!1
V

n
(I) = V

(I) : (20)
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Proof: We show rst that
lim sup
n!1
V

n
(I)  V

(I) : (21)
Indeed, by Lemma A.6, there is a partition (I
1
; : : : ; I
K
) of I into disjoint intervals such that
V

(I) =
K
X
i=1
v (; I
j
) :
By denition of V

n
(I);
V

n
(I) 
K
X
i=1
v (
n
; I
j
) ;
and hence by Lemma A.5
lim sup
n!1
V

n
(I)  lim
n!1
K
X
i=1
v (
n
; I
j
) =
K
X
i=1
v (; I
j
) = V

(I) :
Therefore (21) is established.
Now we show that
lim inf
n!1
V

n
(I)  V

(I) :
Suppose that, on the contrary,
lim inf
n!1
V

n
(I) < V

(I) ; (22)
and that
V

n
(I) =
K(n)
X
i=1
v


n
; I
n
j

for every n and some interval partitions (I
n
1
; : : : ; I
n
K(n)
) of I: As in the proof of Lemma A.6 we
can nd a subsequence fn
k
g
1
k=1
of integers such that K (n
k
)  K, each I
n
k
j
converges to I
j
which is either an interval or an empty set, and the nonempty intervals I
j
form a partition of
I. From Lemma A.5 it follows that lim
k!1
v


n
k
; I
n
k
j

= v (; I
j
) provided I
j
is nonempty,
which implies that
lim inf
k!1
V

n
k
(I) = lim inf
k!1
K
X
i=1
v


n
k
; I
n
k
j


X
I
j
6=;
v (; I
j
)  V

(I) :
This contradicts (22). Thus,
lim sup
n!1
V

n
(I)  V

(I)  lim inf
n!1
V

n
(I) ;
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and so (20) holds.2
The following is a corollary of Lemmas A.5 and A.7.
Corollary A.8: For f
n
g
1
n=1
and  as in Lemma A.5, we have lim
n!1
V

n
(C) = V

(C)
for every community C.
We now prove the assertion of Proposition 4.1 in the case where the cumulative distribution
F has a nite support:
Lemma A.9: If S  I is a nite set and  2 M (I) is supported on S (that is, 
S
= ),
then the game V

possesses a nonempty core.
Proof: For any subset T of S pick a point p
T
2 OP (; T ) ; and consider the set F
consisting of the chosen points. For t 2 S and p 2 F denote c
pt
=  (ftg)  d (jt  pj) : For any
T  S dene
u (T ) = min
0
@
g
X
p2F
y
p
+
X
p2F;t2T
c
pt
z
pt
1
A
;
where the minimum is taken over all z
pt
and y
p
subject to
X
p2F
z
pt
= 1 for all t 2 T; (23)
y
p
  z
pt
 0 for all p 2 F; t 2 T; (24)
y
p
; z
pt
2 f0; 1g for all p 2 F; t 2 T:
The game u (dened on subsets of S) represents a minimum cost solution to a facility
location problem, described as follows. F is thought of as the set of possible facility locations
and T  S as a set of customers using these facilities. The cost of transportation to facility
p incurred by customer t is given by c
pt
; and the cost of opening any facility p is given by
g: The variable y
p
is 1 if facility p is open, and 0 otherwise; the variable z
pt
is 1 if customer
t is connected to facility p and 0 otherwise. Constraints (??) ensure that every customer is
connected to exactly one facility. A customer can only be connected to facility that is open,
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by constraints (??). By Theorem 4.2 of Goemans and Skutella (2000), the nite game u has
a nonempty core, i.e., there is  2 M (S) such that  (T )  u (T ) for every T  S, with
 (S) = u (S) :
The game u can be extended for any community C; by u (C) = u (C \ S) ; and the same
applies to the measure ; it is clear that extended  is in the core of the extended u: It is easy
to check that for any community C  I
u (C) = u (C \ S)  V

(C \ S) = V

(C)
and that u (I) = u (S) = V

(S) = V

(I) : Thus, the measure  is also in the core of the
game V

: 2
Now we turn to our propositions.
Proof of Proposition 2.2: Let  = (I
1
; : : : ; I
K
) be a connected partition of I in which the
inmum in the denition of V (; I) (see (??)) is attained; such a partition exists by Lemma
A.6. Also let p
k
be the I
k
-optimal project for every k; and put P = (p
1
; : : : ; p
K
): From de-
nitions of V and T; T (P; ) = V

(I) + ; and T (P
0
; 
0
)  V

(I) +  for every other PUC
(P
0
; 
0
) : This shows that  is, indeed, an eÆcient connected partition.2
Proof of Proposition 4.1: Given  2 M (I) ; consider the set of its atoms, A. Since A
is at most countable, there is an increasing sequence fA
n
g
1
n=1
of nite sets such that A
n
 A
and
S
1
n=1
A
n
= A: For any n; consider the measure 
0
n
, supported on the set
n
1
n
;
2
n
; : : : ; 1
o
;
and dened there by

0
n

i
n

= 
InA

i  1
n
;
i
n

:
Also consider a measure 
00
n
dened by 
00
n
=
(A)
(A
n
)

A
n
if A is nonempty, and 
00
n
= 0 otherwise.
Denote 
n
= 
0
n
+
00
n
: Thus each measure 
n
is supported on the nite set S
n
=
n
1
n
;
2
n
; : : : ; 1
o
[
A
n
: By checking (ii) of Lemma A.1 and using Remark A.2, it is easy to see that 
n
converges
to ; and 
A
n
converges to 
A
; in the weak topology.
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By Lemma A.9, for each n we can nd a measure 
n
in the core of V

n
: The measures
f
n
g
1
n=1
have a uniformly bounded total mass, since
lim
n!1

n
(I) = lim
n!1
V

n
(I) = V

(I) :
The second equality is due to Lemma A.7, and thus, by Lemma A.3, the sequence has a weakly
convergent subsequence, which for notational simplicity is assumed to be the sequence itself.
Denote the limiting measure inM (I) by : The rest of the proof is dedicated to showing that
 is in the core of the game V

:
We know that 
n
(C)  V

n
(C) for every community C; with V

n
(I) = (I): By Lemma
A.1
lim
n!1

n
(C) =  (C) (25)
for all communities C with  (@C) = 0; since the relative boundary of I in itself is an empty
set, (??) holds in particular for C = I: By Corollary A.8, lim
n!1
V

n
(C) = V

(C). This
shows that
 (C)  V

(C) (26)
for all communities C with  (@C) = 0; equality holds instead of inequality if C = I.
Now let us take a community C 6= I with  (@C) > 0 and disjoint intervals I
1
; : : : ; I
K
such
that C =
S
K
j=1
I
j
. Observe that for any interval I
0
 I
@I
0
=
8
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
finf I
0
; sup I
0
g ; if 0; 1 =2 I
0
;
fsup I
0
g if 0 2 I
0
and 1 =2 I
0
;
finf I
0
g if 1 2 I
0
and 0 =2 I
0
;
; if I
0
= I:
:
Thus, if I
";Æ
1
;Æ
2
j
= [inf I
j
+ "  Æ
1
; sup I
j
+ "  Æ
2
] \ I with Æ
1
; Æ
2
2 f 1; 1g ; then for almost
every " 

@I
";Æ
1
;Æ
2
j

= 0: Therefore (??) holds for C
";Æ
1
;Æ
2
= I
";Æ
1
1
;Æ
2
1
1
[ : : : [ I
";Æ
1
K
;Æ
2
K
K
for almost
every " and every choice of Æ
1
; Æ
2
2 f 1; 1g
k
; since @C
";Æ
1
;Æ
2

S
K
j=1
@I
";Æ
1
j
;Æ
2
j
j
: It follows that
there is a sequence f"
n
g
1
n=1
converging to zero such that (??) holds for every C
"
n
;Æ
1
;Æ
2
; clearly
fC
"
n
;Æ
1
;Æ
2
g
1
n=1
converges to C =
S
K
j=1
I
j
for a suitable choice of Æ
1
; Æ
2
2 f 1; 1g
k
. By countable
additivity of , Lemma A.5, and the fact that C 6= I;
 (C) = lim
n!1


C
"
n
;Æ
1
;Æ
2

 lim
n!1
V


C
"
n
;Æ
1
;Æ
2

= lim
n!1
v

; C
"
n
;Æ
1
;Æ
2

= v (; C) = V

(C) :
30
Therefore (??) is satised for any community C. As we have mentioned, (??) holds as equality
for C = I, which completes the proof of the proposition.2
Proof of Proposition 4.2: According to Proposition 4.1, there is a measure  in the
core of V

. By Theorem C in Halmos (1988), there is a Borel set T  I such that  (T ) = 0
and the measure 
InT
is absolutely continuous with respect to the measure : Now dene a
measure  2 M (I) by  = 
InT
+  (T )  : It is clear that  is absolutely continuous with
respect to ; and we will show that  is also in the core of V

.
Consider a community C 6= I: The measurability of C [T implies that there is a sequence
of communities, fC
n
g
1
n=1
 I; such that
lim
n!1
 ([C
n
n (C [ T )] [ [(C [ T ) nC
n
]) = 0 (27)
and
lim
n!1
 ([C
n
n (C [ T )] [ [(C [ T ) nC
n
]) = 0 (28)
(e.g., use Theorem D in Halmos (1988) for the measure + ). From (??) and the fact that
 (T ) = 0 it follows that
lim
n!1
 ([C
n
nC] [ [CnC
n
]) = 0:
This implies that for any interval [0; t]
lim
n!1
 (C
n
\ [0; t]) =  (C \ [0; t]) ;
and therefore f
C
n
g
1
n=1
converges weakly to 
C
, by Lemma A.1. Thus, as in the proof of
Lemma A.5, it follows that
lim
n!1
v (; C
n
) = v (; C) : (29)
And, from (??),
lim
n!1
 (C
n
) =  (C [ T ) : (30)
Since  is in the core of V

, we have  (C
n
)  v (; C
n
) for any n. Using (??) and (??),
we obtain  (C [ T )  v (; C).
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Therefore  (C) =  (C [ T )   (C [ T )  v (; C) = V

(C), and thus  satises core
equalities for all communities dierent from I: However,  (I) =  (I) = V

(I), and so  is
in the core of the game V

: 2
5.2 Part B
Before proceeding with the proofs of results in Section 3, it would be useful to introduce
the minimal aggregate transportation cost of the set I when it is partitioned into a given
number of communities. As in Lemma A.6, one can show that this minimum exists and is
attained at a connected partition. Thus, for any positive integer K; let
D
K
= min
K
X
k=1
D(I
K
k
); (31)
where the minimum is taken over all partitions 
K
=

I
K
1
; : : : ; I
K
K

of I into K intervals.
We now provide a partial characterization of eÆcient PUC:
Lemma B.1: Suppose that the distribution F possesses a strictly positive density function
f . Let (P; ) be a PUC such that  = (I
1
; : : : ; I
K
) (K  2) is connected and naturally
ordered (that is, for every k < n; if t
k
2 I
k
and t
n
2 I
n
then t
k
< t
n
:) and every p
k
is
I
k
-optimal. Suppose that the minimum in (??) is attained at  and the function f is
continuous in the neighborhood of the end points of all intervals I
k
. If, b
k
= sup I
k 1
=
inf I
k
; then b
k
  p
k 1
= p
k
  b
k
.
Proof: Denote a = inf I
k 1
; b = b
k
; and c = sup I
k
: The following functions on [a; c] ;
g (y) = min
p2[a;y]
Z
[a;y]
d (jt  pj) f (t) dt ( = min
p2[a;c]
Z
[a;y]
d (jt  pj) f (t) dt)
and
h (y) = min
p2[y;c]
Z
[y;c]
d (jt  pj) f (t) dt ( = min
p2[a;c]
Z
[y;c]
d (jt  pj) f (t) dt),
are continuously dierentiable in the neighborhood of b and, by the envelope theorem,
g
0
(b) = d (b  p
k 1
) f (b) ; h
0
(b) =  d (p
k
  b) f (b) :
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By the choice of (I
1
; : : : ; I
K
) ; g (y) + h (y) attains its maximum over [a; c] at the point b; and
thus
d (b  p
k 1
) f (b) = g
0
(b) =  h
0
(b) = d (p
k
  b) f (b) :
Since f is positive, the above equality yields b  p
k 1
= p
k
  b: 2
The next result provides an asymptotic estimate of aggregate transportation costs incurred
by large partitions, and may be of independent interest.
Lemma B.2: Suppose that the distribution F possesses a strictly positive and continuous
density function f; and that d is dierentiable at zero. Then
lim
K!1
K D
K
=
d
0
(0)
4

Z
1
0
q
f (t)dt

2
: (32)
Proof: We will rst establish (??) under assumption that there is an integer n such that f
is a strictly positive function on I, equal to a constant f
m
on each interval of the form [
m
n
;
m+1
n
),
and that d is a linear function. We do not assume at this stage that f is a density function.
Without loss of generality the slope of d; d
0
(0), is positive, since otherwise the equality (??)
is trivial.
Let 
K
=

I
K
1
; : : : ; I
K
K

be a partition of I at which the minimum in (??) is attained. Note,
using Lemma B.1 and the fact that an I
K
k
-optimal project is the midpoint of I
K
k
; that any
two intervals I
K
k
have the same length if their closures belong to the interior of some [
m
n
;
m+1
n
).
Denote by  
m
the set of intervals I
K
k
that \fall" into [
m
n
;
m+1
n
) in the above sense, let a
K
m
be
the cardinality of  
m
:
We claim next that the maximal length of an interval in 
K
is bounded by
c
K
for a
constant c: Indeed, if not, then there is c (K) ! 1 such that the maximal length is
c(K)
K
on
a subsequence of K: Thus there is h > 0 such that every element of 
K
in some [
m
n
;
m+1
n
) has
the length
hc(K)
K
on this subsequence. Therefore
D
K
=
K
X
k=1
D

I
K
k

 min f
K
X
k=1
d
0
(0)

l(

I
K
k

)
2
4

1
n
  2
c(K)
K
c(K)
K
d
0
(0)
min f
4
K
 
hc (K)
K
!
2
;
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where l() stands for the length of the interval. This is bounded from below by
Hc(K)
K
for some
constant H > 0 and all large enough K: The following inequality, however, contradicts the
existence of this lower bound:
D
K

K 1
X
k=1
D
 
[
k   1
K
;
k
K
)
!
+D

[
K   1
K
; 1]


K
X
k=1
d
0
(0)max f
K
2
=
d
0
(0)max f
K
. (33)
We conclude from the previous paragraph that
lim inf
K!1
a
K
m
K
> 0; lim
K!1
n
X
m=1
a
K
m
K
= 1; (34)
and that for every m there is a sequence f"
m
K
g
1
K=1
converging to zero, such that the total
length of all I
K
k
2  
m
exceeds
1
n
  "
m
K
: Since for I
K
k
2  
m
D

I
K
k

= d
0
(0)f
m

l(I
K
k

)
2
4

d
0
(0)f
m
4
 
1
n
  "
m
K
a
K
m
+ 2
!
2
;
we have
D
K
=
K
X
k=1
D

I
K
k


n
X
m=1
d
0
(0)f
m
a
K
m
4
 
1
n
  "
m
K
a
K
m
+ 2
!
2
; (35)
and so
K D
K

n
X
m=1
Kd
0
(0)f
m
a
K
m
4
 
1
n
  "
m
K
a
K
m
+ 2
!
2
: (36)
Since the function g (
1
; : : : ; 
n
) =
P
n
m=1
d
0
(0)f
m
4n
2

m
attains its minimum on the unit simplex
(where
P
n
m=1

m
= 1) at (
0
1
; : : : ; 
0
n
) =

p
f
1
P
n
m=1
p
f
m
; : : : ;
p
f
n
P
n
m=1
p
f
m

; it follows from (??) and
(??) that
lim inf
K!1
KD
K
 lim inf
K!1
n
X
m=1
Kd
0
(0)f
m
a
K
m
4
 
1
n
  "
m
K
a
K
m
+ 2
!
2
= lim inf
K!1
n
X
m=1
d
0
(0)f
m
4n
2
a
K
m
K

d
0
(0)
4
n
X
m=1
f
m
n
2

0
m
=
d
0
(0)
4
n
X
m=1
p
f
m

P
n
m=1
p
f
m

n
2
=
d
0
(0)
4
 
n
X
m=1
p
f
m
n
!
2
=
d
0
(0)
4

Z
1
0
q
f (t)dt

2
: (37)
Thus
lim inf
K!1
K D
K

d
0
(0)
4

Z
1
0
q
f (t)dt

2
: (38)
Now consider a sequence of integers fa
K
m
g
1
K=1
for each m; such that lim
K!1
a
K
m
K
= 
0
m
, and
there are partitions f
K
g
1
K=1
of I in which each [
m
n
;
m+1
n
) is partitioned into a
K
m
equal intervals
I
K
k
. Since
D
K
=
K
X
k=1
D

I
K
k


K
X
k=1
D

I
K
k

=
n
X
m=1
d
0
(0)f
m
4n
2
a
K
m
;
34
and
lim
K!1
n
X
m=1
Kd
0
(0)f
m
4n
2
a
K
m
= lim
K!1
n
X
m=1
d
0
(0)f
m
4n
2
a
K
m
K
=
n
X
m=1
d
0
(0)f
m
4n
2

0
m
=
d
0
(0)
4
n
X
m=1
p
f
m

P
n
m=1
p
f
m

n
2
=
d
0
(0)
4

Z
1
0
q
f (t)dt

2
;
it follows that
lim sup
K!1
K D
K

d
0
(0)
4

Z
1
0
q
f (t)dt

2
:
Using this and (??) we nally obtain
lim
K!1
K D
K
=
d
0
(0)
4

Z
1
0
q
f (t)dt

2
: (39)
Next, we consider a distribution with a strictly positive and continuous density function
f; while maintaining the assumption that d is linear. By the continuity of f , for each n there
is a positive function h
+
n
which is constant on every interval of the form [
m
n
;
m+1
n
); and
0 < h
 
n
(t) = h
+
n
(t)  " (n) < f (t) < h
+
n
(t)
for some " (n) converging to 0: For any interval J let D (J) be dened with respect to h
+
n
and h
 
n
(and denoted by D
h
+
n
(J) and D
h
 
n
(J)), and similarly for D
h
+
n
K
and D
h
 
n
K
. Since clearly
D
h
 
n
(J)  D (J)  D
h
+
n
(J) for every interval J; it follows that
K D
h
 
n
K
 K D
K
 K D
h
+
n
K
: (40)
By applying (??) for K D
h
 
n
K
; K D
h
+
n
K
; and letting n!1; we obtain (??).
Finally, we show that (??) holds even if d is not linear. The dierentiability of d at zero
implies that for any " > 0 there is an l > 0 such that for all intervals J with l(J)  l
D
" 
(J)  D (J)  D
"+
(J) ;
where D
" 
(J) is dened with respect to the transportation cost function given by d
" 
(x) =
max f(d
0
(0)  ")x; 0g ; and D
"+
(J) is dened with respect to d
"+
(x) = (d
0
(0) + ")x: But
the maximal length of an interval in 
K
converges to zero as K ! 1, since otherwise
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lim inf
K!1
D
K
> 0; which is impossible (by taking the partition of I into K equal inter-
vals, the aggregate transportation cost can be made vanishingly small, as in (??)). Therefore
K D
" 
K
 K D
K
 K D
"+
K
(41)
for all large enough K (D
" 
K
and D
"+
K
are dened as in (??), given the denitions of D
" 
(J);
D
"+
(J)). The equality (??) for K D
K
is now obtained by applying it for K D
" 
K
and K D
"+
K
;
and letting "! 0. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.1: The proof will be carried out in two parts. In Part I (??)
will be established for K
g
(I) ( K
g
): In Part II we will prove (??) for any interval J:
Part I. First, note that K
g
!1 as g ! 0: Indeed, if K
g
!1 there is a sequence fg
n
g
1
n=1
that converges to zero and such that K
g
n
 K: It follows that for 
g
n
=

I
g
n
1
; : : : ; I
g
n
K
g
n

lim inf
n!1
K(g
n
)
X
k=1
D(I
g
n
k
) > 0;
and so
lim inf
n!1
K(g
n
)
X
k=1
(D(I
g
n
k
) +G(I
g
n
k
)) > 0: (42)
However, we can consider a sequence f(m (n)g
1
n=1
of integers such that lim
n!1
g
n
m (n) = 0
and lim
n!1
m (n) =1; and partitions 
0
n
=

I
0
1
; : : : ; I
0
m(n)

=

[0;
1
m(n)
); [
1
m(n)
;
2
m(n)
); : : : ; [
m(n) 1
m(n)
; 1]

:
Clearly lim
n!1
P
m(n)
k=1
(D(I
0
k
) +G(I
0
k
)) = 0; and so, from the denition of f
g(n)
g
1
n=1
as optimal
partitions,
lim inf
n!1
K(g
n
)
X
k=1
(D(I
g
n
k
) +G(I
g
n
k
))  lim
n!1
m(n)
X
k=1
(D(I
0
k
) +G(I
0
k
)) = 0;
contradicting (??).
Let " 2 (0; 1) : From the denition of K
g
;
D
K
g
+K
g
g +   D
[(1+")K
g
]
+ [(1 + ")K
g
] g + 
(where [n] stands for the integer part of n), and so "K
g
g  D
K
g
 D
[(1+")K
g
]
. Therefore,
q
"K
2
g
g 
s
K
g
D
K
g
 
K
g
[(1 + ")K
g
]

[(1 + ")K
g
] D
[(1+")K
g
]

:
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Since lim
g!0
K
g
=1; by Lemma B.2,
lim inf
g!0
K
g
p
g 
1
2
q
d
0
(0)
p
1 + "
Z
1
0
q
f (t)dt:
But " 2 (0; 1) was arbitrary, and so
lim inf
g!0
K
g
p
g 
q
d
0
(0)
2
Z
1
0
q
f (t)dt:
Similarly, using the inequality
D
K
g
+K
g
g +   D
[(1 ")K
g
]
+ [(1  ")K
g
] g + 
it can be shown that
lim sup
g!1
K
g
p
g 
q
d
0
(0)
2
Z
1
0
q
f (t)dt;
which nally yields
lim
g!1
K
g
p
g =
q
d
0
(0)
2
Z
1
0
q
f (t)dt:
Part II. For any g consider the minimal interval J
g
which contains the given J and is
composed of intervals in 
g
: Since K
g
(J
g
)  2  K
g
(J)  K
g
(J
g
) ; it suÆces to show that
lim
g!0
K
g
(J
g
)
p
g =
q
d
0
(0)
2
Z
J
q
f (t)dt: (43)
From the eÆciency of 
g
it follows that 
g
j
J
g
(i.e., the set of intervals in 
g
which belong to
J
g
) is an eÆcient partition of J
g
: That is, a J
g
-PUC

P
g
\ J
g
; 
g
j
J
g

minimizes the aggregate
(transportation and project) cost incurred by J
g
: Also, the intervals J
g
clearly \shrink" to J;
since the maximal length of an interval in 
g
converges to zero as g ! 0. Thus, (??) can be
proved by using essentially the same arguments as in Lemma B.2 to deduce from it the claim
of Part I.
To avoid a redundant repetition, we will not give a formal proof of (??). Instead, we will
only indicate its main steps. We note rst, as in Part I, that lim
g!0
K
g
(J
g
) = 1. Then, we
establish an analog of Lemma B.2, that for any function K (g) with positive integer values
and lim
g!0
K(g) =1; and any sequence of intervals J (g) which \shrinks" to J;
lim
g!0
K (g) D
K(g)
(J (g)) =
d
0
(0)
4

Z
J
q
f (t)dt

2
: (44)
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(Here, D
K
(J) is dened as the minimum of
P
K
k=1
D(I
K
k
); taken over all partitions 
K
=

I
K
1
; : : : ; I
K
K

of J into K intervals.)
First, we show that (??) holds for a density function f which is equal to a constant f
m
on
each interval of the form [
m
n
;
m+1
n
); and a linear d. That is,
lim
g!0
K (g) D
f
g
K(g)
(J (g)) =
d
0
(0)
4

Z
J
q
f (t)dt

2
; (45)
where D
f
g
K(g)
(J (g)) is dened with respect to the \density"
5
function f
g
(the value of f
g
on
the i
th
element of the partition of J (g) into n equal intervals equals to the value of f on the
i
th
element of the partition of J into n equal intervals; f
g
coincides with f outside J (g)):
The proof of (??) is very similar to the proof of the rst part of Lemma B.2. At the next
stage, we consider the general density function f and approximate it from above and below
by sequences (h
+
n
)
n
and (h
 
n
)
n
; as in the proof of Lemma B.2. Since, for small enough g; (h
+
n
)
g
and (h
 
n
)
g
also approximate f from above and below,
K (g) D
(
h
 
n
)
g
K(g)
(J (g))  K (g) D
K(g)
(J (g))  D
(
h
+
n
)
g
K(g)
(J (g)) : (46)
Therefore, by applying (??) to K (g)  D
(
h
 
n
)
g
K(g)
(J (g)) and K (g)  D
(
h
+
n
)
g
K(g)
(J (g)) and letting
n ! 1; we obtain (??). The validity of (??) in the case of general d follows as in the
proof of Lemma B.2. Finally, (??) is deduced from (??) (where we take J (g) = J
g
and
K (g) = K
g
(J
g
)) just as in Part I.2
Proof of Proposition 3.2: As in the previous proof, denote by J
g
the minimal in-
terval which contains the given J and is composed of intervals in 
g
: We will show that
lim
g!0
D
g
(J
g
)
K
g
(J
g
)

1
g
= 1: This will suÆce to establish the proposition, since similar methods imply
that lim
g!0
D
g(
J
 
g
)
K
g(
J
 
g
)

1
g
= 1 (where J
 
g
is the maximal interval contained in J , composed of
intervals in 
g
), D
g

J
 
g

 D
g
(J)  D
g
(J
g
) ; and lim
g!0
K
g(
J
 
g
)
K
g
(J
g
)
= 1:
Note that D
g
(J
g
) = D
K
g
(J
g
)
(J
g
). Thus, it remains to show that lim
g!0
D
K
g
(
J
g
)
(J
g
)
K
g
(J
g
)

1
g
= 1:
5
The quotation marks indicate that, aside from being positive, f
g
is not required to satisfy
R
I
f
g
(t) dt = 1:
38
Using (??) and (??), however, it follows that
lim
g!0
D
K
g
(J
g
)
(J
g
)
K
g
(J
g
)

1
g
= lim
g!0
K
g
(J
g
) D
K
g
(J
g
)
(J
g
)
g K
g
(J
g
)
2
=
lim
g!0
K
g
(J
g
) D
K
g
(J
g
)
(J
g
)

lim
g!0
p
g K
g
(J
g
)

2
=
d
0
(0)
4

R
J
q
f (t)dt

2

p
d
0
(0)
2
R
J
q
f (t)dt

2
= 1:
2
Proof of Proposition 2.3: It is a simple corollary of Lemma B.1.2
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